The Inflated Self
By
Ned Block The New York Times, November 26, 2010
Edited by Andy Ross
Self Comes to Mind Constructing the Conscious Brain
By Antonio Damasio Pantheon, 367 pages
Antonio Damasio gives an account of consciousness that emphasizes
wakefulness, self-awareness, reflection, and rationality. Self-consciousness
is a sophisticated and perhaps uniquely human cognitive achievement.
Phenomenal consciousness is something we share with many animals. Damasio
claims that phenomenal consciousness depends on self-consciousness.
According to Damasio, phenomenal consciousness arises from associations
processed in different brain areas at the same time. What makes a conscious
state feel like something rather than nothing is explained as a fusion of
mind and body. Self-consciousness is the result of a procession of neural
maps of inner and outer worlds.
The self is inflated with
self-awareness, reflection, rationality, deliberation and knowledge of one's
existence and the existence of one's surroundings. He argues that a being
needs such a self in order to have phenomenal consciousness.
In The
Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (1976),
Julian Jaynes held that consciousness was invented some three thousand years
ago. Asked what it was like to perceive before consciousness was invented,
Jaynes said it was like nothing at all. Jaynes denied that people had
experiential phenomenal consciousness based on a claim about inflated
self-consciousness.
Damasio also denies phenomenal consciousness
because of the demand of a sophisticated self-consciousness. Patients in a
persistent vegetative state can show signs of phenomenal consciousness.
Damasio says these patients show no clear sign of self-consciousness.
Damasio describes dreaming as paradoxical mind processes unassisted by
consciousness. But dreaming is paradoxical only if one has a model of
phenomenal consciousness based on self-consciousness.
Vivid conscious
experience may be antithetical to self-reflection. In one study, Rafi Malach
presented subjects with pictures and asked them to judge their own emotional
reactions. He then presented different subjects with the same pictures and
asked them to very quickly categorize the pictures. Malach found that the
brain circuits involved in scrutinizing self-reactions were inhibited in the
fast categorization task. Subjects also rated their self-awareness as high
in the emotional reaction task and low in the fast categorization task.
Damasio does not show that phenomenal consciousness requires
self-awareness and so on. He conflates the minimal self with the inflated
self.
AR (December 2010) I'm
reading the book now. It seems more boring than Damasio's earlier books.
The Mystery of
Consciousness
By
John R. Searle The New York Review of Books, June 9, 2011
Edited by Andy Ross
Self Comes to Mind Constructing the Conscious Brain
By Antonio Damasio
Consciousness is a matter of the qualitative experiences that we have.
Conscious states exist only as experienced by a subject. How does the brain
produce qualitative subjectivity?
Science is objective. Consciousness
is subjective. In the epistemic sense, the objective/subjective distinction
is about claims to knowledge. In the ontological sense, the
objective/subjective distinction is about modes of existence. You can have
an epistemically objective science of an ontologically subjective
consciousness.
We know consciousness happens and we know the brain
does it. To find out how, we try to find the neurobiological correlate of
consciousness (NCC), we try to test if the correlations are in fact causal,
and we try to formulate a theory. Most efforts to identify the NCC have
concentrated on the thalamocortical system. Damasio emphasizes other areas
of the brain, especially the brain stem.
Damasio's argument
The brain creates an unconscious mind. The brain also creates the self.
When the self encounters the mind, consciousness results. Whenever I have a
conscious experience I always experience it as mine. Consciousness is always
related to the self.
The brain creates a mind by creating images,
which are unconscious momentary patterns on sheets of neurons called maps.
Perception is the result of mapping. Damasio: "Minds emerge when the
activity of small circuits is organized across large networks so as to
compose momentary patterns. The patterns represent things and events located
outside the brain."
Body mapping is the key to the problem of
consciousness. Having made a mind by making maps, the brain makes the mind
conscious by creating a self, and when the self encounters the mind,
consciousness results, as "a state of mind in which there is knowledge of
one's own existence and of the existence of surroundings."
The self
has three components, the protoself, the core self, and the autobiographical
self. The protoself arises from mental images of the body produced below the
level of the cerebral cortex. The protoself produces primordial feelings.
The core self is about action. It "unfolds in a sequence of images that
describe an object engaging the protoself and modifying that protoself,
including its primordial feelings." These images are now conscious. The
autobiographical self arises from memories of facts and events about the
self and about its social setting. It creates our sense of person and
identity.
Conscious minds begin when the self comes to mind, when
brains add a process involving a sense of self to the mind mix. The
neurology of consciousness is organized around the brain structures
generating wakefulness, mind, and self. Three major anatomical features are
the brain stem, the thalamus, and the cerebral cortex. All three anatomical
divisions contribute some aspect of wakefulness, mind, and self. To be fully
conscious you have to be awake, to have an operational mind, and to have a
sense of self as a protagonist of the experience.
Searle's
criticisms
The Self. It is hard to understand Damasio's
three divisions of the self without supposing that they are already
conscious. If the self is unconscious then it is unclear how its encounter
with a mind results in consciousness. But if it is already conscious then
the account is circular. A conscious self is assumed to explain the
conscious mind.
The Mind. Damasio says the brain creates the mind by
making maps, but he gives no reason to suppose that a map has any
psychological reality at all.
Consciousness. Any type of qualitative
subjectivity is a form of consciousness. The possession of such states is
necessary and sufficient for being conscious. There is no such thing as a
hybrid form of consciousness.
We need to explain how our conscious
states are experienced as my experiences. Damasio takes this characteristic
of the self as primitive.
AR I read part of Damasio's book but found
it stodgy. His earlier books were fresher somehow. Searle has now made the
task easier. Interesting that he too finds "I—me—my" is primitive. That was the
conclusion I came to in my Globorg meditations.
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